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Already in January 1989, 10 months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Robert Heilbroner concluded that the war between capitalism and socialism was over. Capitalism had won:
	The Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe have given us the clearest possible proof that capitalism organizes the material affairs of humankind more satisfactorily than socialism...the great question now seems how rapid will be the transformation of socialism into capitalism, and not the other way around, as things looked only a half century ago (Heilbroner 1989). 

Thus, capitalism's triumph is of a relative nature, rooted as it is in the failure of historical socialism (de Gaay Fortman 1998). While for a long time even in the United States capitalism was an idea which did `not stir much passionate feeling among the mass of the people' (Eugene Rostow 1960: 42), the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe led to a new capitalist euphoria. `Capitalism', Seldon began his treatise of the subject the year after the fall of the Berlin wall, `requires not defence but celebration' (Seldon 1990: ix). And he concluded: `The prospects for capitalism in general are bright.' (Seldon 1990: 373.) This view was widely shared in Eastern Europe. Frustrated by the failures of real existing socialism, the new regimes did not look for some `third way' as an alternative to the two types of economic order. Transition had to be from socialism to capitalism. `The people', Seldon noted, `want to change from socialism to capitalism as soon as they see their families will lead more comfortable lives, with food in more dependable supply, clothes that elevate their spirits, homes that provide privacy' (Seldon 1990: 372).

Today, the euphoria is over. Around 90 % of the population in Eastern Europe is worse off than under socialism. It is true that food is in more dependable supply but they lack the entitlement to acquire it. By now the belief that `sacrifices' are merely of a temporary nature has faded away. Everywhere former communist politicians are elected back into power. Their policies are not based on any claim to restore the communist past, but rather on growing doubts as to the system to which their economies were supposed to be in transition. Indeed, four years after his proclamation of capitalist victory, we find the same Heilbroner `wrestling with the huge problems of making capitalism work as well as possible as long as possible' (Heilbroner 1993: 155). 

Thus, there is good reason to reconsider the `possibility' of capitalism. In the same way in which the question was asked in regard to socialism (de Gaay Fortman 1998), I intend to look at it from a primarily theoretical angle: Is there something wrong with the idea of a capitalist economic order? I am well aware, of course, that this question is not being asked for the first time. The names of Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, for example, immediately come to mind. A political economy analysis of capitalism provides, however, a new challenge after the collapse of real existing socialism. It should be recalled in this regard that socialism was not intended as just an alternative to capitalism but as its successor. In this study our preoccupation with capitalism is as successor to socialism. In that analysis we shall not have any blueprint in mind that might mitigate the effects of a possible negative answer to the question. 






As an Idealtype of economic order, capitalism is based upon Adam Smith's concept of a `natural progress of opulence' (Smith 1776: Book III, Chapter I). Indeed, `we find no concept of progress before the advent of capitalism' (Heilbroner 1993: 155). This progress comes primarily through specialisation in production and division of labour. It is natural in the sense of being rooted in the human being's natural inclinations:
	That order of things which necessity imposes in general, though not in every particular country, is, in every particular country, promoted by the natural inclinations of man (Smith 1776: 291)

The general rule of progress requires that people should be left free to follow their natural inclinations, viz. `the drive to get ahead, to make money, to accumulate capital' (Heilbroner 1993: 42). Capitalism opens the economy to the free formation and accumulation of capital. Its organizing principle is free exchange - the market - as based upon the legal foundations of property and contract (Commons 1924). It is the principle of private property that connects economic decisions and incentives (Chamberlain 1959). This connection is held to be essential: where the risk lies, there the control should lie: `...the power of making decisions will be most wisely exercised if it rests in the hands of those who stand to lose most heavily if the decision turns out badly' (Robertson 1933: 89).

The profit motive constitutes capitalism's central motivating force. Through competition the execution of the acquisitive urge is continuously checked as well as being stimulated. As Halm put it:
	The profit motive as such, does not maintain initiative. Only the constant renewal of the acquisitive urge through elimination of profits by competition guarantees the constant supply of those energies without which the unplanned economy could not work properly. Without the protection through competition, the capitalist economy would become stagnant, unproductive and exploitative (Halm 1951: 53).

Thus, socialism's weakness is capitalism's strength. The system maintains no illusions about people's individual incentives which they are free to follow. However, through free exchange based on the free formation of prices within a competitive framework the urge for private gain is held in check. An invisible hand (Adam Smith) channels the pursuit of multiple different perceptions of self-interest into the public good. In this way the principals-agents problem is supposed to be eliminated. 

Naturally, pure capitalism as described here has never existed in practice. For one thing, the type of competition assumed requires an atomistic market structure -the power of the individual producer being comparable to something as small as an atom- as well as perfectly informed and transparent markets with complete mobility and divisibility of factors of production. Moreover, free entry into all markets is necessary for a continuous elimination of profits that might result from sudden increases in the demand for certain commodities. It is not difficult to see that in reality such conditions cannot be met.

Yet, particularly in the United States continuous efforts have been made to conform reality to the requirements of pure capitalism as an Idealtype. This is the rationale of American antitrust policy. Not surprisingly, it cannot be regarded as a success (de Gaay Fortman 1966: ch. VI.1). For many commodities the size corresponding to the most efficient methods of production is so large that only a small number of large firms survive `the very competition that induces the most economical utilization of resources' (Burns 1936: 8-9). Thus, if a free-enterprise economy is regarded as the `natural' economic order, it is oligopoly, rather than perfect competition, that should be seen as the natural market structure.


3. Capitalist development 

It was on monopoly capitalism that Karl Marx based his theory of capitalist development (1867). As a result of economies of scale the smaller firms will have to go out of production while only the biggest survive. Capital gets concentrated into bigger and bigger units with centralisation into fewer and fewer hands. The entrepreneurs - the `capitalists' - continuously try to increase profits by squeezing surplus value out of the workers. Structural unemployment, caused by the introduction of labour-saving machines, will, however, reduce opportunities to enlarge surplus value and hence lead to a falling rate of profit. At the same time, a growing `industrial reserve army' ensures that wages remain at subsistence level or even below. The gap between the living conditions of the workers and the way of life enjoyed by the capitalists increases. With a proletarian revolution the system comes to its natural end.

Generally, this dynamic analysis of capitalist development has not proved right. In many countries with capitalist systems of production and exchange workers experienced increasing welfare rather than increasing misery. In his theory of structurally increasing unemployment Marx had neglected the impact of rising effective demand through economic growth. Moreover, through the formation of trade unions workers managed to claim a share of income based on labour productivity rather than just subsistence. In oligopoly capitalism - as distinct from the monopoly capitalism that Marx foresaw - rivalry does not generally take the form of price competition, but other forces of a checking and balancing nature appear to manifest themselves. Beside such phenomena as quality competition and interindustry competition (de Gaay Fortman 1966: ch. III) we witness the operation of long term corrective mechanisms like creative destruction (Schumpeter 1947: 83ff.) and countervailing power (Galbraith 1956). `Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary' (Schumpeter 1947: 82). Indeed, in its real manifestations it proved to be a much more flexible type of economic order than either the pure capitalist model or Marx's rather rigid analysis would indicate. Thus, Heilbroner notes `that capitalism's most striking historical characteristic is its extraordinary propensity for self-generated change' (Heilbroner 1993: 41).

While Marx foresaw an end to real existing capitalism as a result of socio-economic failure, other critics appeared to be more concerned about the system's success. Tawney, for example, deplored the character of an acquisitive society in which values have generally become money values. And he notes:
		[The Acquisitive Society] makes the individual the center of his own universe, and dissolves moral principles into a choice of expediences. And it immensely simplifies the problems of social life in complex communities. For it relieves them of the necessity of discriminating between different types of economic activity and different sources of wealth, between enterprise and avarice, energy and unscrupulous greed, property which is legitimate and property which is theft, the just enjoyment of the fruits of labor and the idle parasitism of birth or fortune, because it treats all economic activities at the same level...(Tawney 1920: 31). 

Schumpeter was concerned that without a value system capitalism would not survive. Thus, in the end the capitalist frame of mind `after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, would turn against its own' (Schumpeter 1947: 143). As soon as people learn `the utilitarian lesson' and acquire `the habit of weighing the individual advantages and disadvantages of any prospective course of action' the whole socio-cultural order that has to sustain the system, including the values of family life, will be in jeopardy (ibid: 157). 


4. The Social Market Economy 

The impossibility of a socialist command economy is rooted not primarily in economic unworkability but in the unavailability of a system of government that could sustain such a system over time (de Gaay Fortman 1998). In regard to capitalism, too, the key question concerns the possibility of a political order that can sustain the economic order of free enterprise.

Capitalism's comparative advantage lies in flexibility based on its con​tinuous susceptibility to economic-political compromise. This is, how​ever, dependent upon continuous challenges to trans​form the system's contradictions into actual dissent, opposition, social struggle, collective action and reform. Today, after the collapse of real existing socialism there is, however, a lack of challenging alternative visions. Moreover, as we shall further argue below, capitalism today has acquired a global charac​ter. Thus, the question is whether without socialism global capitalism can survive. Finding an answer to that question first requires some insight into capital​ist economic-political compromise. Its major manifestation is the social market eco​nomy​[1]​ based on the following struc​turally corrective mechanisms to `free' mar​ket economies: the strong state; the welfare state; the responsible company; and social cohesion within a strong civil society. Let us look at these four elements one by one.

The strong state
The role of government under capitalism is first defined in a negative way. `The sovereign', Smith maintained, is completely discharged from `the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society' (1776: 540). Indeed, by interfering in economic life the state would follow a policy `contrary to the natural course of things' (David Hume in his essay on Commerce). Yet, there remain three duties of great importance: the duties of protecting the society against external aggression, estab​lishing an `exact administration of justice', and arranging the provision of collective goods and services. After the great depression of the 1930s it was generally realized that government operations have their effect on the whole economy. Hence, the duties of the capitalist state had to be supplemented with `the responsibility of government to gear its total program to the achievement of full production and full employment' (President Truman in his State of the Union Message of January 1946).

Limited though these tasks may seem to be in comparison to the role of socialist government, they still provide major challenges. How, for example, can we expect capitalism in Russia to become a possibility when the state cannot even establish a minimum degree of law and order, let alone `an exact administration of justice'?  Entrepreneurial cost-benefit accounting is supposed to stay within the limits of the law. Law enforcement aims at keeping criminal behaviour at the margins of society. When crime gets to the centre, including the realm of the state, society is in real trouble. In the civil and commercial sphere, too, a well functioning legal system of a universalist nature​[2]​ is imperative. Unconnected to such a legal system capitalism will follow the law of the jungle.

With respect to the duty to arrange external security real existing capitalism shows a notable tendency towards overarmament.​[3]​ The point is that in `the new industrial state' (Galbraith 1967) supply does not simply follow demand but tries to create its own markets. The military-industrial complex, General Eisenhower already noted, has become an extremely strong force of its own. Merchandising in weaponry has enhanced processes of militarization, particularly in situations of ideological confrontation and in countries with authoritarian regimes. This is one reason why capitalism is considered to be best embedded within a democratic political order. It should ensure that military expenditure would not exceed the requirements of external security while continuously being weighed against other public needs such as health and education.

Smith qualified the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and institutions as follows: `which it can never be to the interest of any individual, or group of individuals, to erect and maintain because the profit would never repay the expence...'. He referred here to the institutions necessary `for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people' (Smith 1776: 566). Such infrastructural investments as the construction of dykes (a typical `free rider problem') can be seen as government responsibilities resulting from market failure. Public education, however, is not really an unavoidable duty of the state in the sense that it organizion on a free enterprise basis were impossible, but to arrange it as a collective service is a means to ensure equality of opportunity for all citizens. Indeed, the phenomenon of collective goods may be better grasped if such products are considered as being socio-politically rather than economically qualified. Thus conceived, collective goods are goods whose collective production is the result of collective action. 

In addition to its role in the provision of collective goods and services, the modern state also has to embark upon public regulation in regard to natural monopolies and industries with unstable markets (De Gaay Fortman and Tinbergen 1990). Pro​tection of the environment requires public ways and means to deal with externalities, i.e. effects of economic activities whose costs are not attributed to those who take the decisions​[4]​ (de Gaay Fortman 1997). Generally, however, capitalist ideology resists a growing influence of the state. We are warned that there exists `a line we dare not cross' (a 60 % share of the collective sector feels Milton Friedman) while there is also a continuous call for deregulation and privatization.

When the economy delivers more private commodities the need for a corresponding public infrastructure naturally increases. Thus, the duty to provide public goods and services is related to private production and consumption in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense. Cars, for example, require roads. Under capitalism, however, social imbalance tends to be a recurrent phenomenon: `The inherent tendency will be for public services to fall behind private production' (Galbraith 1958: 203). This may result in public misery amidst private affluence. 

The welfare state. 
Private property, free exchange and free accumulation of capital, together result in inequality, as Marx already noted. In this respect, the creation of a universalist legal system does not suffice.​[5]​ What Marx did not foresee, however, was the role the state could play in redistributing income. Ideologically the state's redistributive power is highly disputed. Yet, in countries in which a labour movement could combine forces with one or more political parties committed to redistribution, foundations have been laid for a welfare state. A welfare state accepts responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. A typi​cal feature is social insur​ance which offers protec​tion to people in economically weak pos​itions such as unemployed workers, disabled persons, the sick and the aged. A social safety net based on minimum welfare has to protect people without any alternative source of income against absolute and relative poverty. This also implies trans​ferring income from the general taxpayer to the less privi​leged, and hence may contribute to reduction of socio-economic ine​qual​ity. Finally, the adoption and implementation of fiscal and other policies to ensure full empl​oyment is also regarded as part of the welfare state.

The responsible company. 
The mid-twentieth century saw the app​ear​ance of books on topics such as `The Responsible Company' (Goyder 1961) and `Ordering' as a general phenomenon in modern capitalist society (Kuin 1938). Continuity, rather than short term maximum profits, was seen as the guiding corporate prin​ciple. While in private business, naturally, profitability remains a sine qua non, specific norms with which management had to be concerned, came to include good public, industrial and human relations (De Gaay Fortman 1966: 123-124). In fact, the latter might be seen as a response to Archbishop William Templ​e's reply to the question what workers need mostly, viz. social fellowship.

In trying to show light upon the modern corporate entity, Maurer used the metaphor of the solar system:
	The large corporation might better be imagined as a gravitational body, around which resolve several planets in roughly established orbits. In the primary series or orbits are members of the corporate community itself: directors, managers, executives of various degrees, and wage-earners. In the secondary group of orbits are consumers, the public in general, competitors, dealers, distributors, sub-contractors,suppliers and stockholders. In a third and somewhat erratic orbit lies the federal government, in company with the governments of foreign countries in which the corporation operates (Maurer 1956: 167).

The corporation, Maurer concluded, is among other things a social phenomenon. Hence, `social, psychological and historical factors of far wider scope than once customary must be included in economic study' (Maurer 1956: 189).

Social cohesion. 
At this point it seems useful to come back to Schum​peter's prediction of the end of capitalism. Schumpeter noted that with​out moral commitment capitalism would not sur​vive. The pursuit of private interests in the economy would have to be supported by a focus on wider interests in socio-cultural relations. Indeed, capitalism appears to coincide with social stability particularly when embedded in societies based upon social bonding, trust (Fukuyama 1995), affection and a shared sacred meaning (Korten 1996: 261).


5. From Modern to Post-modern Capitalism 

Adam Smith saw his `natural' order as a combination of unorganized business with strong but limited government. We saw, however, that an organizational revolution gave real existing capitalism a character substantially different from its ideal type. Boulding, who introduced the term, was referring not merely to the great corporations but to the growth of governmental departments and agencies, trade unions and other interest groups as well. This development constituted the major reason for many predictions of an end to capitalism from liberal and neo-liberal angles. Yet, it was in fact managerial capitalism (Marris 1964) or collective capitalism (Means 1957) that gave the system its stability. It is true that such an economic order cannot be described in terms of an equilibrium model with determined outcomes, but in practice, through its various checks and balances, in many countries it appeared to work. Other norms than individual self-interest manifested themselves, not only in government and other non-profit sectors, but also within business. Referrence may be made here to the phenomenon of the responsible company (Goyder 1967) that was already described above. 

Indeed, the 20th century capitalist revolution (Berle 1954) may be considered as salvaging rather than destroying capitalism. But it is exactly in the organizational sphere that we notice certain contemporary tendencies which make the central theme of this article rather topical. Capitalism today is of a post-modern rather than post-industrial character. This manifests itself in rapidly moving capital flows, less collective contracts, reduced power of both trade unions and central government, easy shifting of manufacturing activities to new regions, and smaller sizes of each establishment (Lash and Curry 1987). Blitz capital is tuned to quick short term profits rather than continuity with moderate long term profitability. In postmodern capitalism anywhere anytime anyhow anything goes. It is moving towards a 24 hours economy in which employment is no longer a major managerial concern while employability is being substituted for job security. To note the significance of this end-of-twentieth-century capitalist transformation compare, for example, current reorganizations of business activities with their continuous negative effects on employment with Katona's mid-twentieth-century description of the motivational forces operative in the modern corporation:
	The company's volume and its share in the market will become important considerations. The goodwill of the firm's brand name may be given greater weight than the size of liquid assets and profits. Reputation among customers and among suppliers may be assigned large pecuniary value. Beyond the desire to maintain a strong market for his goods, the businessman's interest may extend to the whole country. Maintenance of full employment and avoidance of depression may become goals that influence specific business decisions (Katona 1951: 207).

This may have been put too idealistically but in so far as organized capitalism did correspond to Katona's picture we now witness an end to it. A loss of grip on the economic `order' today manifests itself particularly in the impotence of its political centre. Reviewing the role of government under capitalism we already touched upon three major problems: social imbalance, externalities (including the colossal ecological problematique) and the demise of the welfare state. To these we might add jobless growth, a phenomenon strikingly depicted and illustrated in the Human Dev​elopment Report 1993 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Typically, between 1980 and 1993 the 500 largest corpor​ations in the world dropped 4.4 million jobs, while increasing their sales by 1.4 times, their assets by a factor 2.3 and `com​pensation' for their corporate executive officers by 6.1 times (Van Drimmelen 1996: 4). In the whole industrialised as well as the industrialising world long term unemployment is growing at highly disturbing rates. In Western Europe one in ten workers are un​employed of whom 40% already for more than a year. In Eas​tern Europe one in seven has no paid employment. For Africa, Asia, South and Central America the fig​ures are much higher. This is not so much the result of globalisation and technologi​cal change, the International Labour Office (ILO) comments in its World Employment Report 1995, but rather of (lack of) choices in the fields of economic policy and economic order. While labour productivity will continue to rise, the rise of total production cannot keep pace, if alone for ecological rea​sons. With current labour-saving techniques we may just expect a fur​ther increase of global unemployment. a phenomenon strikingly depicted and illustrated in the Human Development Report 1993 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In the whole industrialised as well as the industrialising world long term unemployment is growing at highly disturbing rates. In Western Europe one in ten workers are unemployed of whom 40% already for more than a year. In Eastern Europe one in seven has no paid employment (The Economist, July 9th 1994). This is not so much the result of globalisation and technological change, the International Labour Office (ILO) comments in its World Employment Report 1995, but rather of (lack of) choices in the fields of economic policy and economic order. While labour productivity will continue to rise, the rise of total production cannot keep pace, if alone for ecological reasons. Hence, far reaching measures are necessary to reduce the pace of operationalising labour-saving techniques. This could be achieved by influencing certain parameters, for example, like the cost of labour and the price of energy. Similarly, government might enhance a fair distribution of employment. 

Apparently, the contemporary capitalist state is unable to perform these tasks. It also fails in maintaining, let alone improving, the quality of its collective goods and services, as well as in protecting the environment and preventing marginalisation of substantial parts of the population. There are even growing problems in the execution of the state's most elementary duty of maintaining law and order on the basis of the rule of law. I see two main reasons for this apparent impotence of the post-modern capitalist state. The first refers to the state as such and the second to the system of government.

While socialism's impossibility is rooted in the principals-agents problem as such (de Gaay Fortman 1998), in regard to the capitalist state a major question is: Who are its principals? (Pitelis 1994: 73). Both neoclassical economics and Marxism give rather simple answers: the consumers (citizens) and the capitalists respectively. In a critique of both theories Pitelis shows that they share `the lack of a historical, evolutionary framework from where emergence, objectives and evolution are derived rather than simply examined ex post' (ibid.: 94). From a historical perspective, in many capitalist countries a state can be observed that is not entirely subject to the interests of private business. Depending on the strength of pluralist democracy and the positions of political parties committed to redistribution and structural change, the state's role showed more nuance. Moreover, `private business' is neither just `capital' nor just consumer interests. Liberal capitalism, the French patron des patrons Yvon Gattaz propounds, has to function as a game of soccer, with an impartial umpire who reliably sticks to the rules. Unfortunately the post-modern capitalist state does not conform to this picture. Not only has capital become incredibly mobile, it also penetrates everywhere. If a more or less autonomous state was ever accepted by the forces of capital, this certainly is not the case today. The tendency is twofold: firstly, what used to be regarded as public is now considered to be private​[6]​ with privatisation as a major slogan. Secondly, we observe increasing attempts everywhere to buy the state's agents. Michel Albert discerns the following three ages of capitalism:
	- 1791: Capitalism against the State
	- 1891: Capitalism encapsulated by the State
	- 1991: Capitalism in place of the State (1991: 292-297.

Recognizing that the realm of capital already `traditionally held the upper hand' (Heilbroner 1993), today more than ever the realm of the state is in jeopardy. The second reason for this predicament lies in the contemporary operation of democracy. While electoral defeat could be considered as a constraint to the state's principals (Pitelis 1994: 98-99), elections become subject to pecuniary manipulation. This point will be further explored in the third and last part of this triad: Is democracy possible?. (See the next issue of this Journal)


6. Global Capitalism 

Naturally, postmodern capitalism, as described and discussed here, is a generalisation. In different parts of the world we find different types of capitalism. This, in fact, is Michel Albert's main point, as argued in his Capitalisme contre Capitalisme. But today Rhineland capitalism, too, is affected by postmodernity. Yet, Heilbroner may be right when he asserts the possibility that advance and adaptive capitalisms - `slightly imaginary Swedens' - will make their appearance (Heilbroner 1993: 155). The major problems, however, are with global externalities - the CO2 and Ozone layer problematique, for example - and with the globalisation of the whole economic process. 

Economic and financial globalisation
Globalization implies the manifestation of forces shaping the lives of people at a global rather than a territorially linked level (the local or national). Indeed, it may be conceived as a process transforming the world into one single place (R. Robertson: 1992). Its different aspects com​prise, inter alia, trade and finance, corporate activity, standard-setting (common scales of measurement as well as universal human rights), cul​ture (including global consumerism), ecology (a.o. the effects on the global climate and the ozone layer) and a growing con​scious​ness of the world as one single place (Scholte 1997: 222). 

Economic globalisation may be seen as `both a rise in economic activity that is world-wide in scope and a growing intensifica​tion of economic flows and activities across societies and between people' (Perraton et al. 1997). Thus, it relates to gro​wing extensivety of world trade -today the majority of countries trade with the majority of others (Nierop: Ch. 3)- as well as its intensity, with a current world export-world produc​tion ratio of about 20%. Presently, trans​national corporations (TNCs) conduct 70% of global trade (Human Development Report 1994). The growing importance of the global corporation may also be illus​trated by the current figure for intra-company trade of 30% of the global figure.

In his When Corporations Rule the World Korten speaks of a sec​ond industrial revolution (1996: 240). The first industrial rev​olution just replaced muscle power by machines. Through tariff structures much of the immediate unemployment resulting from such ways of increasing labour productivity was shifted to the colonies (in the textiles industry, for example). The second industrial revolution is based on the exploita​tion of informa​tion and communication technology: computers and electronic sen​sors can `give machines eyes, ears and brains to see and hear, interpret and act'. If this development continues it might lead to corporations with almost no human workers and managers. This would, indeed, `represent capitalism at its very purest, com​pletely unconcerned with anything but safe profit and power' (Dugger, in Korten 1996: 241).

This second industrial revolution, Korten argues, is also based on pro​cesses of colonisation, in this case `defined more by class than by geo​graphy and is forcing ever more of the world's population in the ranks of the colonized' (1966: 240). This ana​lysis seems to be in line with Martin's prediction of a global development in the direction of a 20:80 society: a dual society in which 20 % participates actively in the econ​omy with ever increasing work burdens​[7]​ while the remaining 80 % have to sat​isfy themselves with hardly any work in the formal sector of the economy, a meagre income and tittytainment (1997). Hence, for those excluded merely a modern form of little bread and games on the screen will be available. 

In the same vein, we may speak of a first and second financial revol​ution. The first one occurred in the second half of the nineteenth cen​tury. It manifested itself particularly in the growing importance of fi​nancial titles, securities. This had considerable effects on the nature of wealth. While previously wealth had been incorporated in estate and hence displayed a certain degree of both visibility and accessibility -depending upon the relative success of pro​cesses of socialisation of pri​vate property- it now became embodied in movables and hidden. `Fortunes mobiles, fortunes secrètes', Georges Ripert observed in his Aspects juridiques du capitalisme moderne (1946). Ripert mentions the following `revolutionary increase' in movable wealth in France: from a total capital of FF 9 billion in 1850 to FF 115 billion in 1912, a rise by 1200 % in 62 years. Today we experience a second financial revol​ution: from real trade in actual currencies and securities to electronic claims in regard to future values. Financial globa​lisation becomes pri​marily app​arent in the increase of foreign exchange trading from ± US$ 15 billion in 1973 to ± US$ 60 billion in 1983 to some US$ 1,200 billion in 1997. The trade in financial titles is now primarily in derivatives (options, swaps, futures), a business in which in no time fortunes may be accumulated. The Euro-dollar market has reached an amount of over US$ 4,000 billion. The total financial turn-over exceeds world trade in real values by a factor fifty.

Naturally, such developments affect the nature of capitalism. Illustrative for The End of Organised Capitalism (Lash and Curry 1987) is what happened to Barings Bank (e.g. The Economist, March 4th-10th, 1995). In a world of hedging, arbitration, futures (including for​wards) and margin calls, a world in which one individual can move markets while in security derivatives alone more than US$ 1000 billion daily circu​lates, corporate risk appears to be acceptable even though bankruptcy may involve banks of high repute. System risk is still another matter as the salvaging operation for Mexico, early 1995, has demonstrated (Chesnais 1995). Few people would, however, deny that in this blitz world a collapse of the whole global financial system is a serious risk.​[8]​

In his account of the impact of the global corporation Korten uses the Mexican example to illustrate the high price the world has to pay for economic and financial globalisation. In the period 1993-1994 a popu​list government attracted an enormous amount of foreign capital. Mere​ly 10% of this ended up in the real sphere; the rest fell into the hands of people who appar​ently had the power to use it for purely financial investments. As a result, in that same period ten more Mexican nation​als joined the ranks of billionaires (in US$). In December 1994 the Peso collapsed. For a short while the Central Bank still sup​ported the national currency, thus transferring its dollar reserves to those who speculated against the Peso. After the inevi​table devaluation a pro​gramme of budget cuts had to be carried out that cost 750,000 people their job.

The crisis of global politics
As a result of processes of economic and financial globalisation as described here, capitalism's four areas of political and socio-cultural imbedding are all seriously affected. The global eco​nomy lacks a strong political institu​tion while there are no corrective mechanisms to global inequal​ity. Having lost its imbedding in specific communities the glo​bal corporation has got detached from the human interest. Final​ly, globalisation has its downside: exclusion with the ensuing processes of social disintegration. 

Global political disorder. The lack of grip on a world in econ​omic disorder today manifests itself particularly in the impo​tence of its politi​cal centre. Although obviously global markets would have to be supple​mented by supranational institutional arrangements, global governance is almost entirely lacking (Human Development Report 1992). The international economic order still shows the major traits of colonial exploitation. In a global context corrective mech​anisms are almost en​tirely absent. There is, indeed, a striking dichotomy between economic globalisation and the lack of global political control. 

Although conceptually the foundation of a universal inter-gov​ernmental organisation for peace and development -the United Nations- may be characterised as one of the few `breakthroughs in twentieth century politics, regardless of how successful it has been in practice' (Bassin 1994: 1), world government remains an illusion. In a time of economic globalisation this has seri​ous consequences. While in a national context processes of social development could correct social injustices in order to assure socio-political stability, globally we lack such mechan​isms. Hence, nation-states, and the treaty systems among them, remain of utmost importance (Delmas 1997). Unfortunately, how​ever, economic and financial globalisation seems to be weakening rather than enforcing the state. In this way these processes appear to affect the sustainability of the capitalist system.

Deepening poverty. A major problem that has always been con​nected with capitalism is socio-economic inequality and the lack of pro​tection against poverty and destitution. In this respect, the figures are frightfully dis​turbing: an estimated ratio of 150:1 between the one billion people at the top and the one billion at the bottom of world income distribution (HDR 1992). Although in the world as a whole the proportion of poor people appears to have fallen considerably, in absolute terms we are still confronted with a frightful problematique. An estimated 1.3 billion of people have to survive on less than the equivalent of $1 per day (HDR 1997: 5). This amounts to more than one quarter of the glo​bal population. The average income for an inhabit​ant of the globe today is almost $5000, a figure which makes the severe poverty of hundreds of millions of human beings `a scandal -ref​lecting shameful inequalities and inexcusable fail​ures of natio​nal and international policy (HDR 1997: 2).

Notably, processes of enrichment and exclusion are not two dis​tinct and separate processes. As Elliott has argued, `both excl​usion and down​ward mobility, which are no more than the pro​ces​ses of relative and absolute impoverishment, are most frequently the reverse image of the enrichment of another group' (1979). This has become most clearly noticeable at the global level. In regard to global structures of produc​tion, finance and trade the words of the Greek philosopher Thucydides still apply: `The strong do what is in their power and the weak accept their fat​e'. 

Intra-state collective violence. A great concern in our world today is the growth of intra-state collective violence. Incom​prehensible and unexplainable as the atrocities and the horror of wars such as those in Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan -to men​tion just a few examples- may be, there still exists one undeniable stylised fact​[9]​: socio-econ​omic depri​vation breeds violence. In regard to `ordinary' crime, this link is relatively well known. `Where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence', Kaplan observes (1994: 72). In regard to armed conflicts already a sup​erficial look at both the list of collectively violent events in the nineties and the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking in UNDP's Human Develop​ment Reports reveals that armed conflicts were located primarily in the countries at the bottom of the HDI lists, i.e. the so-called Third World. At the same time, armed conflicts have been almost absent in the so-called First World. Thus, our world today shows its dual character also in the manifestation of intra-state collective violence.


Growing environmental insecurity. Security has to do with the many threats people face in their lives. Security in a broad sense encompasses safety. Safety means protection against disas​ter. You may fall in the water, for example, but with your life belt you are safe. In addition, secur​ity means a minimisation of risks. Thus, it is important to take preventive measures so that you won't fall into the water. Security implies both prevention and protection. It means freedom from disaster, fear, attack and violent disruption. This encompasses many different aspects, amongst which the environment tends to play an increasingly important part.

In a narrow interpretation environmental security highlights the danger of inter- and intra-state violence as a result of envi​ronmental and resource conflicts. An illustration is the Horn of Africa where lack of sustainable development is regarded as a major cause of armed conflict (e.g. Molvær 1991). More contro​versial is the construction of a rather general link of ecology with security in the sense that environmental degradation is conceived as a direct threat to human survival, even without the immediate prospect of armed conflict (Soroos 1994: 319). What is generally welcomed is the broadening of vision in regard to threats and vulnerabilities. Little is gained, however, if the inclusion of environmental concerns in the security problema​ti​que would have to be seen as a sacrifice `to the jealous deity of sovereignty' (Stoett 1994a: 127). 

Despite recent attention for insecurity from within, security remains primarily a concern of sovereign states with external threats and vulner​abilities. In this respect the mandate of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio do Janeiro (1992) is rather ambiguous. In fact, it emanated from a General Assembly resolution that stressed the sovereign right of states to develop their own resources pursuant to their own policies although their activities must not cause environmental damage to areas beyond their jurisdiction. Thus, the challenge of environmental security continues to be set in the context of a world of sover​eign states. Yet, it is precisely in such a set​ting that the environmental crises developed. Falk already expressed his doubts in 1971 in The Endangered Planet 
	A world of sovereign states is unable to cope with endangered-planet problems...Such a system exhibits only a modest capac​ity for international cooperation and coordination. The dis​tribution of power and authority, as well as the organization of human effort, is overwhelmingly guided by the selfish drives of nations (quoted by Stoett 1994b: 135).

In view of the seriousness of the threats and vulnerabilities environ​mental security would require some rather hard decisions. However, the spaces in which those decisions will have to be taken are still deter​mined by a world of sovereign states. In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration each state has to apply the precautionary prin​ciple in estimating the risks related to its own environmental behaviour. The general preoccu​pation with economic growth, as endorsed by the same declaration makes it highly unlikely that this will be done honest​ly, wholeheartedly and with full acceptance of the consequences in terms of direct `human welfare' for its own citizens. Environ​mental choices are based on perceptions of risks and the protec​tion of vested interests (Stoett 1994b: 745). Not surprisingly, what we note in practice is not so much risk-aversion but rather risk-redistribution. 

It is, indeed, the redistribution of risk rather than the redis​tribution of wealth and resources that now dominates the inter​national agenda. Thus, it is the South that is supposed to miti​gate the effects of environ​mental threats and vulnerabilities in the North, e.g. in its contributions to the CO2 problematique, the supply of energy to the industrialised world and its portion of global pollution. It is in such a climate that the Rio fol​low-up meetings in New York 1997 and Manila 1998 could only end in a complete flop. 

Social disintegration Pointing to the unbridled operation of money as our world's primary driving force Korten uses the term colonisation:
	What we are experiencing might best be described as a case of money colonizing life. To accept this absurd distortion of human institutions and purpose should be considered nothing less than an act of collective, suicidal insanity (1996: 247).

Modern types of `progress' based on new technologies frequently forced substantial numbers of people off their land -through a `green revolution' for example- and out of their jobs. In such situations institu​tional mechanisms to support humane processes of transition often failed or were even entirely lacking. Those facing the consequences of those processes of marginalisation and exclusion do not always quietly accept their fate. Regional and even global migration became phenom​ena of huge impact on the social fabric of societies. Not surprisingly Korten sees social disintegration as part of the `threefold crisis' of humanity. His analysis discharges into the following conclusion:
	We are now coming to see that economic globalisation has come at a heavy price. In the name of modernization we are creating dysfunctional societies that are breeding patho​logical behaviour -violence, extreme competitiveness, suicide, drug abuse, greed, and environmental degradation- at every hand. ... The threefold crisis of deepening poverty, environmental destruction, and social disintegration is a manifestation of this dysfunction (1996: 261-262). 

Thus, we are once again reminded of Schumpeter's still unful​filled prediction of an end to capitalism through its own ideo​logical impact. The real threat, then, is that the `economic motive' in its individ​ualist-materialist version permeate and dominate all spheres of life. 


7. The End of Capitalism?

It is time to come to conclusions. Was Fukuyama right  when, in a Hegelian sense, he predicted the end of history in `the content of the universal homogeneous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic' (Fukuyama 1989: 8)? The end of history? It rather feels like the end of civilisation. In any case, our analysis of the idea of capitalism in theory and practice points into an entirely different direction.

Firstly, pure capitalism is impossible. Corporate or organised capitalism, with a state more or less above firm and market and reasonably fulfilling its duties of government, manifested a good degree of historical stability. At the end of the twentieth century, however, we witness serious threats to existing types of relatively sustainable capitalism. Most threatening is the globalisation of capitalism without any accompanying socialisation of the international economic order.

Giving free play to material self-interest, capitalism `is assuredly a social order that draws its acquisitive energies from the unconscious substratum of behaviour' (Heilbroner 1993: 160). Thus, economic interests may overcome more dangerous passions (Hirschman 1977). As Keynes has put it: 

	Dangerous human proclivities can be canalised into comparatively harmless channelled by the existence of opportunity for money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority, and other forms self-aggrandisement. It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative' (Keynes 1936: 374).

However, the forces unravelled tend to be so strong that it is not easy to keep these within limits. While in a global setting in many respects Marx's analysis still throws light upon capitalist development, it is particularly in the industrialised countries that Schumpeter's fears seem to materialise. Indeed, postmodern capitalism is turning against its own. 

By destroying the socio-cultural and political order that has to sustain it, Schumpeter believed the capitalist process would also create the conditions for another type of economic order (Schumpeter 1947: 162). In his perception that would be socialism. In a post-socialist world it is, however, rather difficult to see a successor to capitalism and its cult of selfishness (Stretton: 1989, ch...). If there is indeed a `tendency toward another civilization that slowly works deep down below' (Schumpeter 1947: 163), that new order is not yet easy to discern. Could it be based on another interpretation of progress than materialism, a view which characterised socialism and capitalism together? 

`The pursuit of wealth', the first Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford, Nassau Senior, asserted in his inaugural lecture, `is, to the mass of mankind, the great source of moral improvement' (quoted in Munby 1956: 238). `One is taken by surprise', Cardinal Newman commented, `on meeting with so categorical a contradiction of our Lord, St. Paul, St. Chrysostom, St. Leo, and all Saints' (ibid.). Yet, Nassau Senior's view is still very much alive. In its search for a moral justification of capitalism The Economist notes: 

	Capitalism is a species of freedom. Give people certain rights (such as the rights to own property and sell their labour) then leave them alone and capitalism is what you get. Capitalism is a good thing mainly because freedom is a good thing (January 22nd 1994).

Freedom is seen here as the free pursuit of wealth. As set out in this article this linear view of progress not only meets very serious set-backs, it also deceives. The promises of material progress appear never to result in saturation while increasingly being accompanied by social, cultural, political and ecological deterioration. After the betrayal of `the god of progress' (Goudzwaard 1979: 249) with his prophet of economic growth, which new idea will constitute the spiritual basis of the economic order?
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^1	      	The term was coined by Chancellor Ludwig Erhardt in regard to the West German economy of the 1960s. Currently, a distinction is made between the Anglo-Saxon model and le modèle rhénan (Albert 1991). In Rhineland capitalism as this is found in Germany, Swit​zerland, the Benelux countries, Scandinavia and in a certain variety also in Japan the degree of socialisation of certain functions of business is much higher than in countries like Great Britain and the United States. As a consequence these `Rhineland' countries face less socio-economic marginalisation of people and less socio-cultural polarisation. For a contemporary analysis of British capitalism proving Albert's point see Hutton 1995. 
^2	      	The term universalist denotes an orientation towards legal security based on equality of all people before the law and equal treatment of equal cases.
^3	      	Historical socialism is not remarkably different in this respect. This has to do firstly with the authoritarian character of socialist regimes and secondly with the political power developed by their military industrial establishments.
^4	      	For example, acid rain, resulting from bio-industry, may destroy woods and thus, amongst other things affect a whole tourism indu​stry. 
^5	      	Anatole France once referred to the majestic equality of all before the law, which prohibits the rich and the poor alike to sleep under the bridges and to beg on the streets.
^6	      	Michel Beaud recites a child who, walking with his father in the woods, suddenly asks: "Say, to whom do we have to pay?" (Beaud 1994: 16). In a world in which people increasingly have to pay for services that used to be free, this is, indeed, a typical question. 
^7	      	Actually, in the United States increasing working hours as well as burdens can already be noticed.
^8	      	If not Barings but Chase Manhattan had gone bankrupt as a result of a massively taken wrong position, we would already have been quite near that situation. There is fear that major earth​quakes in Tokyo or California rather than `just' Kobe, suddenly result​ing in a tremendous reduc​tion of the value of real assets, might lead to a financial crisis that could spark off system col​lapse.
^9	      	`Stylised' in the sense that naturally no two wars are the same.
